

The Indefinability of Language

Meaning, Use, and Self-Inquiry

Wim van der Loo

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Table of Contents

Preface.....	35
1 Introduction.....	37
1.1 Methodological Justification and the Use of Artificial Intelligence.....	38
1.2 Methodological Remark	39
2 Introduction to the Thesis.....	40
2.1 Possible Objections to the Thesis and Replies.....	40
The Performative Contradiction Objection	40
The Relativism and Normativity Objection	41
The Philosophy of Science Objection.....	41
The Subjectivity Objection: Does the “I” Disappear?	42
The Distinction Between Meta-Level and Reflection.....	43
The Pragmatic Objection: Does the Thesis Paralyze Itself?	43
3 Logic vs. the semantics of a natural language	44
3.1.1 Logic as formalization $\neq$ foundation	44
3.1.2 The meta-level problem: no Archimedean point.....	44
3.1.3 What logic <i>can</i> do for semantics	45
3.1.4 Summary.....	45
3.2 Model-theoretic vs. use-oriented semantics	45
3.2.1 Model-theoretic semantics	45
3.2.2 Use-oriented (pragmatic / inferential) semantics.....	46
3.2.3 The core contrast (condensed)	47
3.2.4 Philosophical upshot relative to your thesis.....	47
3.2.5 Final conclusion	47
3.2.6 Between model-theoretic and use-oriented semantics.....	47
3.2.7 The problem of self-reference	47
3.2.8 The “I” in model-theoretic semantics	48
3.2.9 The “I” as a speech act (use-oriented)	48

3.2.10	Self-reference reconsidered	48
3.2.11	No meta-level for the “I”	49
3.2.12	Summary contrast	49
3.2.13	Interim conclusion	49
3.3	Self-consciousness and first-person knowledge	49
3.3.1	First-person knowledge: what is distinctive?	49
3.3.2	The classical mental model—and its problems	50
3.3.3	Use-oriented reinterpretation: not observation, but position	50
3.3.4	Transparency and authority (without mystery)	51
3.3.5	Self-consciousness without a meta-level	51
3.3.6	Summary contrast	51
3.3.7	Final conclusion	51
3.4	Rationality and Agency	52
3.4.1	From self-consciousness to incompleteness	52
3.4.2	From self-consciousness to agency	52
3.4.3	Rationality: not computation, but normativity	52
3.4.4	Brandom: agency as commitment management	53
3.4.5	Davidson: interpretation and rationality	53
3.4.6	No external criterion of rationality	53
3.4.7	Freedom without metaphysical mystery	53
3.4.8	Rationality, agency, and the “I”	54
3.4.9	Summary schema	54
3.4.10	Concluding formulation	54
3.5	Incompleteness and the semantics of natural language	54
3.5.1	What the incompleteness theorems strictly state	54
3.5.2	Why direct application to natural language is a mistake ...	55
3.5.3	Nevertheless: a structural analogy (not a reduction)	55
3.5.4	Self-reference: Gödel vs. use	55

3.5.5	What the incompleteness theorems <i>do</i> mean philosophically for semantics.....	56
3.5.6	Crucial distinction: openness $\neq$ defect.....	56
3.5.7	Summary schema.....	56
3.5.8	Final conclusion	57
3.6	Logic and the Semantics of a Natural Language	57
3.6.1	Can semantics be grounded in logic?.....	57
3.6.2	What “grounding” would have to mean here	57
3.6.3	Why logic cannot be a semantic foundation.....	57
3.6.4	What logic <i>can</i> do for natural language	58
3.6.5	Why Gödel indirectly confirms this	59
3.6.6	The use-oriented conclusion.....	59
3.6.7	Summary schema.....	59
3.6.8	Final formulation.....	59
3.7	Truth and Validity	59
3.7.1	Logic between world-relatedness and practical normativity.....	59
3.7.2	Two notions that are often conflated.....	60
3.7.3	The model-theoretic approach: truth prior to validity.....	60
3.7.4	The use-oriented reversal: validity prior to truth.....	60
3.7.5	Brandom: two dimensions of validity.....	60
3.7.6	Davidson: objectivity without foundations	60
3.7.7	Why this is not relativism.....	61
3.7.8	Truth without an external meta-level	61
3.7.9	Schema: truth vs. validity	61
3.7.10	Final conclusion	61
3.8	Truth, Validity, and Scientific Objectivity.....	62
3.8.1	Objectivity without an external meta-level.....	62
3.8.2	The classical conception of scientific objectivity.....	62

3.8.3	The reversal: objectivity as stabilized validity.....	62
3.8.4	Sellars: no “given,” but normative discipline.....	63
3.8.5	Davidson: objectivity without foundationalism	63
3.8.6	Brandom: science as an explicit practice of reasons.....	63
3.8.7	Tarski and the limits of formalization	63
3.8.8	Kuhn without relativism	63
3.8.9	Schema: reconceived objectivity.....	64
3.8.10	Final conclusion	64
3.9	Natural Sciences vs. Humanities	64
3.9.1	Truth, validity, and differentiated objectivity	64
3.9.2	The classical opposition (and its misleading character).....	64
3.9.3	A shared core: normative validity.....	65
3.9.4	Where, then, does the real difference lie?	65
3.9.5	Natural sciences: highly stabilized validity	65
3.9.6	Humanities: context-sensitive validity	65
3.9.7	Ludwig Wittgenstein and the grammatical difference.....	66
3.9.8	Donald Davidson: one truth, different routes of access	66
3.9.9	Robert Brandom: explicitness vs. implicitness.....	66
3.9.10	Schema: differentiation without hierarchy.....	66
3.9.11	Final conclusion	66
3.10	Mathematics as a Boundary Case between the Natural Sciences and the Humanities.....	67
3.10.1	Truth, validity, and maximal normativity.....	67
3.10.2	Why mathematics is a boundary case	67
3.10.3	The classical picture: mathematics as foundation.....	67
3.10.4	Kurt Gödel: objectivity without closure	68
3.10.5	Mathematical truth as stabilized validity.....	68
3.10.6	Mathematics between nature and spirit.....	68
3.10.7	Ludwig Wittgenstein: mathematics as grammar	69

3.10.8	Donald Davidson and Robert Brandom: maximal explicitness.....	69
3.10.9	Schema: mathematics as a boundary practice	69
3.10.10	Final conclusion.....	69
3.11	Mathematical Idealization in Physics	70
3.11.1	Truth, validity, and norm-governed access to the world....	70
3.11.2	What is mathematical idealization?.....	70
3.11.3	Why physics cannot dispense with idealization.....	70
3.11.4	Idealization $\neq$ approximation.....	70
3.11.5	Idealization and validity	71
3.11.6	Mathematics as the normative grammar of physics.....	71
3.11.7	Donald Davidson and structural objectivity.....	71
3.11.8	Idealization and Kurt Gödel: no ultimate model	71
3.11.9	Why idealizations are not fictions.....	72
3.11.10	Summary schema	72
3.11.11	Final conclusion.....	72
3.12	Mathematical Idealization in Physics	72
3.12.1	Newtonian Mechanics and Relativity as a Case Study.....	72
3.12.2	Newtonian mechanics: idealization as a normative framework	73
3.12.3	Why Newtonian mechanics is nevertheless objective	73
3.12.4	Relativity: revising idealization, not rationality.....	73
3.12.5	Why relativity does not “refute” Newton	74
3.12.6	What this implies about truth	74
3.12.7	Mathematics as a changing grammar.....	74
3.12.8	No meta-level decides in advance.....	74
3.12.9	Schema: Newton vs. Einstein.....	75
3.12.10	Final conclusion.....	75
4	Space, Time, and the “I”	76

4.1.1	The internal logic of your thesis.....	76
4.1.2	Philosophical positioning	76
4.1.3	The Big Bang as the emergence of language	77
4.1.4	The individual as a local articulation.....	77
4.1.5	Critical sharpening (important)	78
4.1.6	Conclusion	78
4.2	An Analysis Based on Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems	78
4.2.1	Gödel in One Sentence (the Relevant Part)	79
4.2.2	Translation to Your Thesis (Language / Self without an External Meta-Level).....	79
4.2.3	The ‘I’ as an Internal Object: the Gödelian Knot.....	80
4.2.4	The Big Bang as the “Emergence of Language”: What Gödel Does and Does Not Do.....	80
4.2.5	Where the Analogy Is Sharp (and Where It Breaks).....	81
4.2.6	A Compact Gödelian Reformulation of Your Core Idea ...	81
4.3	The Core Thesis (Clearly Formulated)	82
4.4	Grammar Instead of Representation	82
4.5	Why This Can Never Be Free of a Language Game	82
4.6	A Gödelian Sharpening (Structural, Not Mathematical)	83
4.7	The ‘I’ and the Universe: Not Two Separate Things.....	83
4.8	What Your Position Does Not Say (Important)	84
4.9	Final Condensed Formulation	84
4.10	How Should I Understand the Big Bang?.....	84
4.11	The Big Bang in Physics (Minimal Clarity).....	84
4.12	Philosophical Perspective: The Big Bang as a Limit, Not an Object.....	85
4.13	Your Perspective: The Big Bang as the Emergence of Grammar.....	85
4.14	Why This Is Neither Mysticism Nor Naïve Realism.....	85
4.15	The ‘I’ Within This Framework.....	86

4.16	A Maximally Precise Formulation	86
4.17	What You Do Not Need to Do	86
4.18	Explicit Comparison with Modern Philosophy of Nature (Structural Realism)	87
4.19	What Is Modern Structural Realism?	87
4.20	From Entities to Structure (Crucial for the Big Bang)	87
4.21	The Big Bang Within Structural Realism	87
4.22	Why “Grammar” Is Not a Loose Metaphor Here	88
4.23	Where Your Position Goes Beyond Standard Structural Realism..	88
4.24	6. The ‘I’ in Structural-Realist Terms	89
4.25	Final Conclusion (Highly Condensed).....	89
4.26	An Analysis Concerning a “Theory of Everything”	89
4.27	What Is Meant by a “Theory of Everything”?	89
4.28	Structural Realism: What a ToE Can Be	90
4.29	Why a ToE Cannot Be an Ultimate Explanation	90
4.29.1	3.1 Grammar $\neq$ Justification	90
4.30	The Gödelian Limit Applied to a ToE	90
4.31	The ToE as Maximal Grammar (Your Reading)	91
4.32	The Big Bang and the ToE	91
4.33	The ‘I’ and the ToE.....	91
4.34	Summary Thesis (Very Sharp)	91
4.35	Where This Positions You	92
4.36	Why Popular Claims by Stephen Hawking (“We Would Know the Mind of God”) Are Philosophically Misplaced.....	92
4.37	Confusion Between Structure and Ground	92
4.37.1	What Hawking Suggests.....	92
4.37.2	Why This Is Misplaced	92
4.38	Confusion Between Theoretical Content and Meta-Statement..	93

4.39	Confusion Between Knowledge and Self-Transparency	93
4.40	The Gödelian Lesson (Applied Structurally)	93
4.41	Unintended Theological Smuggling	93
4.42	What a Correct Formulation Could Have Been	94
4.43	One-Sentence Summary	94
4.44	What Is Inflationary Theory? (Concise and Precise)	94
4.45	Structural Realism: What Inflation Actually Explains	94
4.46	Inflation as a Grammatical Extension (Your Perspective)	95
4.47	Why Inflation Does Not Explain the “Ultimate Beginning”	95
4.47.1	Inflation Already Presupposes Grammar	95
4.47.2	“Eternal Inflation” Intensifies the Problem	95
4.48	The Gödelian Lesson Applied to Inflation	96
4.49	The ‘I’ and Inflation	96
4.50	Why Inflation Undermines Hawking-Style Claims	96
4.51	Summary Thesis (Highly Concentrated)	96
4.52	Final Position	97
4.53	An Explicit Comparison with String Theory and Loop Quantum Cosmology	97
4.54	Overview: Three Theories, Three Grammatical Strategies	97
4.55	Inflation: Extension Within an Existing Grammar	97
4.55.1	Philosophical Status	98
4.56	String Theory: Syntax Prior to Semantics	98
4.56.1	What String Theory Does	98
4.56.2	Grammatical Interpretation	98
4.56.3	Philosophical Limit	98
4.57	Loop Quantum Cosmology: Grammar Becomes Discrete	98
4.57.1	What LQC Does	98
4.57.2	Grammatical Interpretation	99
4.57.3	Philosophical Implication	99

4.58	Comparison with Respect to the Core Question: “The Beginning”	99
4.59	The Gödelian Moral (Structural)	99
4.60	The ‘I’ in All Three Cases	99
4.61	Summary Thesis (Highly Concentrated)	100
4.62	Where This Positions You	100
4.63	A Contrast with Tegmark’s Mathematical Universe Hypothesis	100
4.64	What MUH Precisely Claims.....	100
4.65	Structural Realism: The Middle Ground Between You	100
4.66	First Rupture: MUH Treats Structure as Language-Independent; You Do Not	101
4.66.1	MUH.....	101
4.66.2	Your View (Grammar / Language Games).....	101
4.67	Second Rupture: MUH Absorbs the “Why”; You Preserve It as a Boundary	101
4.68	Third Rupture: Gödel, Computability, and MUH’s Adaptive Strategy	101
4.69	Fourth Rupture: Empirical Content and Falsifiability	102
4.70	Where Your Position Truly Engages MUH.....	102
4.71	A Sharpened Formulation (Optional).....	102
4.72	A Specific Contrast with Tegmark’s Level-IV Multiverse.....	102
4.73	What Level-IV Precisely Claims	103
4.74	The Measure Problem: Why This Is Fatal (Not Technical, but Principled).....	103
4.74.1	The Problem	103
4.74.2	Your Grammatical Diagnosis.....	103
4.75	The “Typical Observer”: Why SAS Cannot Rescue the Program..	103
4.75.1	Tegmark’s Idea.....	103
4.75.2	The Problem	104

4.75.3	Your Sharpest Point	104
4.76	Selection Principles: Anthropic or Computational?.....	104
4.76.1	Why This Fails	104
4.76.2	Your Grammatical Conclusion.....	104
4.77	Gödel and Self-Reference (Structurally Applied)	104
4.78	The Deepest Contrast in One Table.....	105
4.79	The Core Error of Level-IV (Very Sharp).....	105
4.80	What Your Position Does—and Level-IV Cannot.....	105
4.81	Final Formulation (Definitive).....	105
4.82	How Does My Existence Relate to the Existence or Emergence of the Universe?	106
4.83	Two Meanings of “Coming into Being” (Which Must Not Be Confused).....	106
4.83.1	(A) Physical coming into being.....	106
4.83.2	(B) Coming into being as appearing <i>as a world</i>	106
4.84	Structural Realism: The Universe Before You $\neq$ the Universe for You.....	106
4.85	Your Grammatical Commitment (This Is Where It Becomes Sharp).....	106
4.86	Does the Universe Come into Being at Your Coming into Being?	107
4.86.1	No — not physically	107
4.86.2	Yes — grammatically / existentially.....	107
4.87	Why This Is Not Solipsism	107
4.88	The Big Bang and Your Birth (Parallel, Not Identical).....	108
4.89	A Formulation That Holds Everything Together.....	108
4.90	Where This Places You Philosophically	108
4.91	I Cannot Know the Moment of My Coming into Being — How Does That Relate to Placing Myself in a Calendar?.....	109
4.92	Two Meanings of “the Moment of My Coming into Being” ..	109

4.92.1	(A) Coming into being as an event in the world.....	109
4.92.2	(B) Coming into being as the appearance of a perspective.....	109
4.93	Why You Cannot Know Your Own Coming into Being (in Principle)	109
4.94	What, Then, Does a Calendar Do?	109
4.95	The Core Relation: Calendar $\neq$ Self-Origination	110
4.96	Why This Is Not Relativism.....	110
4.97	Why This Runs Parallel to the Big Bang.....	110
4.98	A Heideggerian Formulation (Optional, but Apt).....	110
4.99	Final Answer (Very Precise).....	111
4.100	Explicitly Connecting Time in Physics and Time in Experience.....	111
4.101	Two Forms of Time That Do Not Coincide	111
4.102	Time in Physics: Time as Structure.....	111
4.103	Time in Experience: Time as a Condition of Possibility	112
4.104	Why You Cannot Experience Your Own Coming into Being.....	112
4.105	The Calendar: A Bridge, Not a Solution.....	112
4.106	The Deep Parallel: You and the Big Bang	113
4.107	Why This Is Not Dualism.....	113
4.108	Final Answer (Condensed)	113
4.109	Final Reflection — Beginnings Without a Beginning.....	114
4.109.1	Final Reflection — Beginnings Without a Beginning	114
4.110	The Self: Coming into Being as a Boundary, Not an Event	114
4.111	The Big Bang: Beginning of Time, Not a Beginning in Time.....	114
4.112	The Theory of Everything: Maximal Grammar, Not Ultimate Ground....	115
4.113	The Deep Parallel (in One Schema).....	115

4.114	What This Means for “Existence”.....	115
4.115	The Final Sentence (Everything Together).....	115
4.116	Explicit Positioning with Respect to the Block Universe vs. Becoming	116
4.116.1	Final Philosophical Comparison.....	116
4.117	Final Comparison — Block Universe, Becoming, and Your Position... ..	116
4.117.1	The Two Classical Positions (Concise and Clear)	116
4.117.2	Why Your Position Is Neither of the Two.....	117
4.117.3	Time in Physics → Block Universe (Legitimate)	117
4.117.4	Time in Experience → Becoming (Unavoidable).....	117
4.117.5	Your Position: Grammatical Differentiation of Time.	117
4.117.6	The Beginning (You ↔ Big Bang ↔ ToE) in This Light.....	118
4.117.7	Why This Is Philosophically Stronger Than Either Camp.....	118
4.117.8	Final Position (Definitive).....	118
4.117.9	Final Sentence (Closing).....	118
4.118	“I exist after my father and mother” — how does this relate as a language game?.....	119
4.118.1	“After my parents” belongs to a specific language game.....	119
4.118.2	Two different “I’s” (grammatically)	119
4.118.3	Why “after” shifts meaning here.....	120
4.118.4	The crucial inversion (this is the key).....	120
4.118.5	Why this is not solipsism.....	120
4.118.6	Descent as an internal story, not a foundation.....	121
4.118.7	Parallel with the Big Bang and the ToE (closing).....	121
4.118.8	Final formulation (very precise).....	121
4.119	Explicitly connecting birth, death, and mortality as language games.....	122

4.119.1	Three concepts, three language games	122
4.119.2	Birth: a date without a beginning (language game of objects).....	122
4.119.3	Death: an event without experience (language game of others).....	122
4.119.4	Mortality: not an event, but a structure.....	123
4.119.5	The decisive coherence (this is the core)	123
4.119.6	Parallel with the Big Bang and the ToE (explicit)	123
4.119.7	What this does to “after my parents”	124
4.119.8	Final formulation (book-worthy).....	124
4.119.9	Closing remark (important).....	124
4.120	“The universe does not exist without me, but neither does it exist because of me; it exists in me as a grammatical phenomenon” — clarified... ..	125
4.120.1	Three distinct claims that are often confused	125
4.120.2	What does “existence under the condition of language” mean?.....	126
4.120.3	The Moon: not part of you, yet grammatically bound	126
4.120.4	What does it mean to say “the universe exists in me”?.....	127
4.120.5	The connecting role of natural language.....	127
4.120.6	A sharper reformulation of your sentence	128
4.120.7	Final synthesis	128
4.121	“The universe is not mine, but neither is it independent of me; it is that which can appear only where language is in use.”	128
4.121.1	What this means for me as a researcher in astrophysics.....	128
4.121.2	Core reformulation (applied to research)	128
4.121.3	First consequence — What you actually investigate... ..	129
4.121.4	Second consequence — What explanation means for you.....	129

4.121.5	Third consequence — How you treat limits and singularities..	129
4.121.6	Fourth consequence — Your role as a researcher.....	130
4.121.7	What this does <i>not</i> mean (important).....	130
4.121.8	Final formulation (researcher’s version).....	130
4.122	Contrasting with the self-image of the physicist as a “discoverer of what really is”.....	131
4.122.1	The classical self-image: the physicist as discoverer..	131
4.122.2	The core weakness of this self-image (conceptual)....	131
4.122.3	Your position: the physicist as explicator of grammar	131
4.122.4	Discovering vs. articulating (the decisive difference)	132
4.122.5	Why your position is stronger (not weaker).....	132
4.122.6	The role of the physicist: from witness to participant.	132
4.122.7	Re-reading claims like “we now know how things really are”.....	133
4.122.8	Final formulation (book-ready)	133
4.122.9	Final positioning.....	133
4.123	“A second (s) is the SI unit of time, officially defined as the duration of exactly 9,192,631,770 oscillations (periods) of the radiation of a cesium-133 atom at rest.”	133
1)	First: what kind of sentence is this definition?	133
2)	The language game: measuring by fixing	134
3)	Why this is not circular reasoning	134
4)	Objectivity without a metaphysical foundation.....	134
5)	The role of “at rest” and other clauses	135
6)	What this shows about time itself.....	135
7)	The parallel with your earlier themes	135
8)	Summary in one sentence.....	136
4.124	Extending this to time dilation (what happens to the language game in relativity?)	136

1) The classical language game of time (before relativity)	136
2) The relativistic break: what becomes untenable?	136
3) What happens to the language game of the second?	137
4) Time dilation as a rule, not a paradox.....	137
5) Objectivity remains — but changes form.....	137
6) Why this perfectly fits your earlier analysis	138
7) A compact formulation (usable as text)	138
8) Closing in your line.....	138
4.125 GPS as a practical language game	138
1) What is GPS as a language game?.....	138
2) The classical language game fails — GPS forces expansion	138
3) Which grammatical rules are explicitly required?	139
4) Objectivity as coherent coordination	139
5) Einstein as a grammatical reformer	139
6) GPS as an answer to the fear of relativism.....	139
7) The deep parallel with your earlier themes	140
8) Summary in one sentence.....	140
4.126 Trust: why do we believe GPS?	140
1) Trust $\neq$ belief in a hidden reality	140
2) GPS as a self-confirming language game	140
3) Why this is not circular reasoning	141
4) Institutional trust without metaphysics.....	141
5) What we do <i>not</i> trust (and why that's fine).....	141
6) Trust as a grammatical attitude.....	141
7) Parallel with your earlier themes.....	142
8) Summary in one sentence.....	142
4.126.1 What does “time not absolutely describable” mean? ..	142
4.126.2 The classic mistake: confusing absolute description with objectivity.....	143

4.126.3	What kind of defensibility does relativity then have?.	143
4.126.4	4) Why relativity becomes stronger without absolute time.....	143
4.126.5	The contrast with untenable positions	144
4.126.6	The deeper structure (in your terms)	144
4.126.7	Summary in one concentrated formulation	144
4.126.8	Closing remark (philosophically sharp)	144
5	Evolution – brain – “I”	146
5.1.1	The eye: description from within.....	146
5.1.2	Language as a language game.....	146
5.1.3	Why there can be no external meta-level	146
5.1.4	Where the eye example does and does not apply	147
5.1.5	The ‘I’ as a linguistic function.....	147
5.1.6	Summary	147
5.2	Can I ultimately explain or describe the functioning of my eye?.....	147
5.2.1	What would “ultimate” mean?.....	147
5.2.2	Why an ultimate explanation of the eye is impossible	148
5.2.3	The Wittgensteinian point	148
5.2.4	Why the eye seems different from language	148
5.2.5	Conclusion	149
5.3	Deepening the Analysis via Contemporary Neurophilosophy	149
5.3.1	What are neural correlates?	149
5.3.2	Why correlation is not explanation.....	149
5.3.3	The category mistake.....	150
5.3.4	Why reduction fails here.....	150
5.3.5	The language-game argument (connecting to your earlier point).....	150
5.3.6	Contemporary positions (briefly).....	151

5.3.7	7. Conclusion.....	151
5.4	How should I understand Broca's area, Wernicke's area, and the homunculus as a language game?.....	151
5.4.1	First: what does "as a language game" mean here?.....	151
5.4.2	Broca and Wernicke as diagnostic grammar	152
5.4.3	Why this is not a localization of meaning	152
5.4.4	The homunculus: an explicitly grammatical object.....	152
5.4.5	The perspective problem (first vs. third person).....	153
5.4.6	Why this is not relativism.....	153
5.4.7	Summary.....	153
5.5	Why connectivism does not "eliminate" Broca's and Wernicke's areas, but reinterprets them.....	154
5.5.1	What "elimination" would mean (and why it does not happen).....	154
5.5.2	The shift: from place to role	154
5.5.3	Why this is a language-game issue.....	154
5.5.4	Why Broca's and Wernicke's areas continue to function.....	155
5.5.5	What connectivism explicitly rejects	155
5.5.6	Philosophical core.....	155
5.5.7	One-sentence summary	155
5.6	Aphasia is a speech disorder in some sense — how should this be understood as a language game?.....	156
5.6.1	What does "speech disorder" mean within a language game?.....	156
5.6.2	Aphasia as a disturbance of participation	156
5.6.3	Why aphasia is recognizable only within a language game.....	156
5.6.4	Clinical tests as regulated language games	157
5.6.5	Relation to Broca's and Wernicke's aphasia (brief).....	157
5.6.6	Why this is not a denial of reality	157

5.6.7	Summary	157
5.7	Is schizophrenia a disturbed capacity to participate in language practices?.....	158
5.7.1	What “participation in language practices” means here..	158
5.7.2	The crucial difference from aphasia.....	158
5.7.3	Where the disturbance lies (in language-game terms)....	159
5.7.4	Why this is not a “language disorder”	159
5.7.5	Why the “language-game” perspective helps — and where it stops.	159
5.7.6	One sharp formulation.....	160
5.7.7	Conclusion	160
5.8	I experience consciousness — how should I interpret consciousness in relation to myself and the world in which I exist? ..	160
5.8.1	Consciousness is not a thing you possess.....	160
5.8.2	Consciousness as relation, not as content.....	161
5.8.3	You are not a spectator, but a participant	161
5.8.4	The “I” and consciousness	161
5.8.5	Why consciousness cannot be grounded	162
5.8.6	A precise formulation.....	162
5.8.7	Summary	162
5.9	Why the “hard problem” of consciousness may be a grammatical problem.....	162
5.9.1	What the hard problem claims	162
5.9.2	The grammatical illusion.....	163
5.9.3	Comparison: the “hard problem” of meaning	163
5.9.4	4First-person vs third-person: not a gap, but two grammars.	163
5.9.5	Why explanation reaches its limit here	164
5.9.6	What remains, then?	164
5.9.7	One sharp formulation.....	164

5.10	Sharpening why “qualia” derail grammatically.....	165
5.10.1	What “qualia” purport to do.....	165
5.10.2	How experience-words normally function	165
5.10.3	What “qualia” do wrong grammatically	165
5.10.4	A comparison that sharpens the problem.....	166
5.10.5	Why this does <i>not</i> mean experience is “not real”	166
5.10.6	One sharp formulation.....	167
5.10.7	What remains without “qualia”?	167
5.11	Describing a “déjà vu” as a language game.....	167
5.11.1	What we do when we say “déjà vu”	167
5.11.2	The grammar of déjà vu	168
5.11.3	What “familiarity” means here	168
5.11.4	Why “déjà vu” does not name an object.....	168
5.11.5	The social aspect of the language game	168
5.11.6	Relation to science (secondary)	169
5.11.7	Summary.....	169
5.12	How does the desire for a complete description and explanation of myself as an individual relate to the incompleteness theorems?	169
5.12.1	What your desire is really asking	169
5.12.2	What Gödel actually shows	170
5.12.3	The parallel with self-understanding (not an identity claim).....	170
5.12.4	Why a complete self-description is impossible.....	170
5.12.5	The missing meta-level	171
5.12.6	Incompleteness is not a defect, but constitutive.....	171
5.12.7	A precise formulation	171
5.12.8	What <i>is</i> possible.....	171
5.12.9	Final sentence.....	172

5.13	A comparison with standard neurological models of meaning.....	172
5.13.1	What standard neurological models of meaning aim to do.....	172
5.13.2	What these models <i>do</i> explain.....	172
5.13.3	The crucial shift: function $\neq$ meaning.....	173
5.13.4	The structural limit (Gödel-like).....	173
5.13.5	Where the model depends on what it explains.....	173
5.13.6	Why this does not justify eliminating meaning	174
5.13.7	The Wittgensteinian correction	174
5.13.8	Summary comparison.....	174
5.13.9	Final formulation	174
5.14	A comparison with enactivism vs. predictive processing	175
5.14.1	What is at stake: what is perception/meaning?	175
5.14.2	Predictive processing (PP)	175
5.14.3	Enactivism	176
5.14.4	The real difference: where is normativity located?	176
5.14.5	The link with incompleteness	176
5.14.6	Why PP does not replace enactivism.....	177
5.14.7	One sharp formulation.....	177
5.14.8	Closing.....	177
5.15	Why “emergence” is often merely a relabeling here.....	177
5.15.1	What “emergence” promises.....	177
5.15.2	What actually happens: a shift in vocabulary.....	178
5.15.3	The core problem: cause vs. ground	178
5.15.4	Strong vs. weak emergence (and why both fall short).....	178
5.15.5	The grammatical derailment.....	179
5.15.6	A comparison that makes the problem sharp	179
5.15.7	Why emergence remains attractive	179