PROTECTING PENSION RIGHTS IN TIMES OF ECONOMIC TURMOIL

Edited by
Yves Stevens



Distribution for the UK: Distribution for the USA and Canada:
Hart Publishing Ltd. International Specialized Book Services
16C Worcester Place 920 NE 58th Ave. Suite 300

Oxford OX1 2JW Portland, OR 97213

UK USA

Tel.: +44 1865 51 75 30 Tel.: +1 800 944 6190 (toll free)

Email: mail@hartpub.co.uk Tel.: +1 503 287 3093 Email: info@isbs.com

Distribution for Austria: Distribution for other countries:
Neuer Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Intersentia Publishers

Neuer Wissenschaftlicher Verlag
Argentinierstraße 42/6
Groenstraat 31
1040 Wien
Groenstraat 31

Austria Belgium
Tel.: +43 1 535 61 03 24 Tel.: +32 3 680 15 50
Email: office@nwv.at Email: mail@intersentia.be

Protecting Pension Rights in Times of Economic Turmoil Yves Stevens (ed.)

© 2011 Intersentia Cambridge - Antwerp - Portland www.intersentia.com

ISBN 978-94-000-0161-9 D/2011/7849/2 NUR 825

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FOREWORD

Protecting Pension Rights in Times of Economic Turmoil presents nine papers on the consequences of the financial and economic crisis on pension schemes throughout the world. They are revised versions of papers that were originally presented at the annual conference of the European Network of Supplementary Researchers in 2009 in Leuven, Belgium.

This book originates from the widespread concern about on the one hand the graying of the population and on the other hand the financial and economic crisis of the 2008 and 2009. Both concerns are long term issues. Different countries react very differently. As shown in this book, reactions vary throughout the world.

The intensity of discussions relating to supplementary pensions has increased sharply due to these various reactions. In some countries the systems themselves are under revision or already altered. The question on the exact value and worth of supplementary occupational pensions is being asked again. The debate on the role of these pensions in the guaranteeing of provisions for old age has been revitalized. If we are honest, we have to admit that this debate was no longer truly on the political agenda.

During the last decades there seemed to have grown a popular worldwide belief in supplementary occupational pensions as a remedy for the so-called failing state based pensions. Nowadays this belief seems to have been shaken. The probable truth is that most countries require both state based pensions and various forms of other pensions to face adequately the graying society and that there is clearly not one answer that fits all.

This book offers various answers whereby the reader is hopefully inspired to look at his or her own national pension system. The authors hope that this book can be a creative and capable resource of inspiration.

Special thanks are due to Lucy apRoberts, Bryn Davies and Barbara Waine, who edited the coference papers.

Yves Stevens Leuven, December 2010.

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