

BEHAVIOURAL ECONOMICS IN CONSUMER POLICY

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The Economic Analysis of Standard
Terms in Consumer Contracts
Revisited

Hanneke LUTH



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¹ These acknowledgements have been written while enjoying an extended stay in Oxford, visiting my twin sister and future member of Parliament, Margreet. The extension was due to a misunderstanding involving the country of Iceland. Following the collapse of Landesbanki, the Netherlands and the UK had requested cash from this icy nation, but somehow the letter 'C' was lost in translation, which unfortunately resulted in the cancellation of flights, including but certainly not limited to my own.

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² Acronyms seem to be as useful and popular in academic communities as they are annoying for outsiders. Therefore, some clarifications are due. RILE: Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics; EDLE: European Doctorate in Law and Economics; JAR: Legal PhD Association Rotterdam; EPAR: Erasmus PhD Association Rotterdam; BACT: Behavioural Approaches to Contract and Tort, the research programme in ESL that this PhD project is a part of; ESL: Erasmus School of Law.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

B2B; B2C; C2C	Business-to-business; business-to-consumer; consumer-to-consumer; referring to contracts
CLAB	European Database on Case Law about Unfair Contractual Terms
DCFR	Draft Common Frame of Reference: Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law
DG SANCO	Directorate General for Health and Consumers, part of European Commission
ECC	European Consumer Centres
ECJ	European Court of Justice
EC / EEC	European Community / European Economic Community
EU	European Union
FTC	Federal Trade Commission (US)
NMa	Dutch Competition Authority
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFT	Office of Fair Trading (UK)
RECAP	Record, evaluate and compare alternative prices, a method for giving people feedback on their choices
RCT	Rational Choice Theory
RIA	Regulatory Impact Analysis
SER	Social Economic Council (the Netherlands)
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States of America
WRR	Scientific Council for Government Policy (the Netherlands)

