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# THE RATIONALITY OF DICTATORS

# Towards a more effective implementation of the responsibility to protect

Maartje Weerdesteijn



Intersentia Ltd

Sheraton House | Castle Park

Cambridge | CB3 0AX | United Kingdom

Tel.: +44 1223 370 170 | Fax: +44 1223 370 169

Email: mail@intersentia.co.uk

www.intersentia.com | www.intersentia.co.uk

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NBN International

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Tilburg, September 2016

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