

The Principle of Legality in European Criminal Law

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ABBREVIATIONS

AC	Appeal Cases
AFSJ	Area of Freedom Security and Justice
AG	Advocate General
All ER	All England Law Reports
App.	Application
BGH	Bundesgerichtshof
BVerfG	Bundesverfassungsgericht
Cr App R	Criminal Appeal Reports
CS	European Coal and Steel Community Treaty
DCC	Dutch Criminal Code
EAW	European Arrest Warrant
EC	European Community
ECHR	European Convention of Human Rights
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECLI	European Case Law Identifier
EComHR	European Commission of Human Rights
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
EPPO	European Public Prosecutor's Office
ER	The English Reports
EU	European Union
EWCA Crim	Court of Appeal Criminal Division
EWHC	High Court of Justice
EWHC Admin	High Court (Administrative Court)
GCC	German Criminal Code
HR	Hoge Raad
KB	Law Reports King's Bench Division
Law Com	Law Commission (UK)
LJN	Landelijk Jurisprudentie Nummer
NJ	Nederlandse Jurisprudentie
NJW	Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
OJ	Official Journal
OLG	Oberlandesgericht
Para.	Paragraph
QB	Law Reports Queen's Bench Division
RG	Reichsgericht
RGSt	Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen
Stb	Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Abbreviations

The Charter	Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
UK	United Kingdom
UKHL	House of Lords
WLR	Weekly Law Reports
ZaöRV	Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht
ZIS	Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik
ZStW	Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft