# Parliamentary Immunity

A Comprehensive Study of the Systems of Parliamentary Immunity of the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands in a European Context

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# DISSERTATION

to obtain the degree of Doctor at the Maastricht University, on the authority of the Rector Magnificus, Prof. dr. L.L.G. Soete in accordance with the decision of the Board of Deans, to be defended in public on Thursday 26 September 2013, at 16.00 hours

by

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Sascha Hardt Maastricht, July 2013

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#### LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union
CSP Standards and Privileges Committee
CSPL Committee on Standards in Public Life
ECHR European Convention of Human Rights

ECJ European Court of Justice

ECtHR European Court of Human Rights

EP European Parliament
EU European Union

ICERD International Convention on the Elimination of all Racial

Discrimination

MeP Member of the European Parliament

MP Member of Parliament

TEC Treaty establishing the European Community

TEU Treaty on European Union

UK United Kingdom