



Compensating Ecological Damage  
Comparative and Economic Observations



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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AEC	Atomic Energy Commission
ANI	American Nuclear Insurers
APPA	Air Pollution Prevention Act (China)
ART	Alternative Risk Transfer
AtG	Atomgesetz
AVB	Aansprakelijkheidsverzekering Bedrijven (Liability Insurance Policy)
Bofas	Bodemsaneringsfonds voor tankstations
BP	British Petroleum
CERCLA	Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (US)
CGAA	Coast Guard Authorization Act
CGMTA	Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act
CLAPV	Centre for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims
CLC	International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage
CMC	Chinese Commercial Maritime Code
COFR	Certificate of Financial Responsibility (US)
CPL	Civil Procedural Law (China)
CRISTAL	Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution
CRS	Congressional Research Service
CRTD	Civil Liability for Damage Caused during Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels
CSC	Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage
CSMAA	China Shipowners Mutual Assurance Association
CWA	Clean Water Act (US)
DOE	Department of Energy (US)
DOI	Department of Interior (US)
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights

List of Abbreviations

EDA	Environmental Damage Prevention and Remediation Act (Germany)
EGA	Environmental Guarantee Account
EII	Environmental Impairment Insurance
EIL	Environmental Liability Insurance Policies
ELD	Environmental Liability Directive
ELINI	European Liability Insurance for the Nuclear Industry
EMANI	European Mutual Association for Nuclear Insurance
eNGO	Environmental Non-Governmental Organization
ENO	Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrence
EPA	Environmental Protection Act (US)
ERF	Engineering Rating Factor
ERICAM	Environmental Risk Internalisation through Capital Markets
EU	European Union
GAO	General Accounting Office (US)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDV	German Insurance Association
GONGO	Government-Organized Non-Governmental Organization
GPCL	General Principle Civil Law (China)
GPL	General Public Liability Policies
GTPL	General Third Party Liability Policies
HNS	International Convention on Liability and Compensation in Connection with Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
Ibs	Interimwet Bodemsanering
IMO	International Maritime Organization
INPO	Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
INTERTANKO	International Association of Independent Tanker Owners
IOPCF	International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund
LRTAP	Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
Lugano Convention	1993 Lugano Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment
MAERP	Mutual Atomic Energy Reinsurance Pool
MAS	Milieu-aansprakelijkheidsverzekering Samenwerkingsverband (Environmental Liability Insurance)
MEP	Ministry of Environmental Protection
MEPA	Maritime Environmental Protection Act (China)
MOE	Minister of the Environment
MS	Member States (of the European Union)
MSA	Maritime Safety Agency
MSV	Milieuschadeverzekering (Dutch Environmental Damage Insurance)
NEA	OECD Nuclear Energy Agency
NEIL	Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited

NELIA	Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance Association
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NPL	National Priority List
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRD	Natural Resource Damage
OCIL	Oil Casualty Insurance Ltd.
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OJ	Official Journal (of the European Union)
OPA	Oil Pollution Act (US)
OSLTF	Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund
PAA	Price-Anderson Act (US)
P&I Clubs	Protection and Indemnity Clubs
PLA	Public Liability Action
RCRA	Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (US)
RRG	Risk Retention Group
SFP	Secondary Financial Protection
SMCRA	Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act
SME	Small or Medium Enterprises
SOA	State Oceanic Agency
SUBAT	Stichting Uitvoering Bodemsanering Amovering Tankstations ((Foundation for the Remediation of Petrol Stations) (The Netherlands)
SWPPA	Solid Waste Pollution Prevention Act (China)
TEU	The Treat on European Union
TFEU	The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TLL	Tort Liability Law (China)
TOVALOP	Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability for Oil Pollution
UHV	Environmental Impairment Liability Insurance (Germany)
UK	United Kingdom
USV	Allgemeine Versicherungsbedingungen für die Umweltschadensversicherung (Environmental Damage Insurance) (Germany)
U.S.	United States
VAN	Verenigde Assurantiebedrijven Nederland
WANO	World Association of Nuclear Operators
Wbb	Wet Bodembescherming
WPPA	Water Pollution Prevention Act (China)
WTP	Willingness to Pay





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