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# DEFINITION OF THE RELEVANT MARKET

(Lack of) Harmony between Industrial  
Economics and Competition Law

Hila NEVO



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Intersentia Ltd  
Sheraton House | Castle Park  
Cambridge | CB3 0AX | United Kingdom  
Tel.: +44 1223 370 170 | Email: mail@intersentia.co.uk

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