

Mens rea and defences in European criminal law

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Jeroen Blomsma



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CONTENTS

<i>Acknowledgements</i>	v
<i>List of abbreviations</i>	xvii

Part 1

Setting the scene	1
------------------------------------	---

Chapter I

Introduction.	3
1. Context of the research	3
1.1. <i>Mens rea</i> and defences.	3
1.2. The general part of criminal law	3
1.3. European criminal law.	4
2. The need for a general part of European criminal law	5
2.1. Implementation of Union legislation in national law	6
2.2. Autonomous or national concepts	8
2.3. Recklessness or <i>dolus eventualis</i>	8
2.4. Convergence or divergence	11
2.5. Direct enforcement	13
2.6. Guidance	14
3. Outline	15

Chapter II

Method	17
1. First stage: gathering data	18
1.1. Comparative legal research	18
1.2. Contextual approach	22
1.3. EU Perspective: from fragments to a whole	23
1.4. Criminal law	24
2. Second stage: synthesis.	25
2.1. The scope of the general part.	26
2.2. Consistency and coherency	28
2.3. Enforceability.	30
2.4. Compatibility with human rights and constitutional traditions	31
2.5. Criminal legal theories	33
2.5.1. The object of punishment	33

2.5.2. The character of criminal law	33
2.5.3. The purpose of general principles	35
2.6. Fair labelling	35
2.7. Conclusion	36
Part 2	
<i>Mens rea</i>	39
Chapter III	
What is <i>mens rea</i> ?	43
1. Analytical tool	43
2. Fault element	44
3. Demarcation from other subjective elements	45
4. Demarcation from blameworthiness	46
5. Framework of criminal liability	48
6. Demarcation from <i>actus reus</i>	50
6.1. Verbs that imply a subjective element	50
6.2. Causation	51
6.3. Attempt, participation and more	53
7. Objectivism and subjectivism	54
7.1. Proof of fault	55
7.2. Moderate objectivism	56
Chapter IV	
Fault elements	59
1. Introduction	59
1.1. Kinds of fault, reflecting degrees of culpability	59
1.2. Three kinds of fault	60
1.3. Principles of fault	62
2. <i>Dolus (in)directus</i>	63
2.1. Terminology	64
2.2. <i>Dolus directus</i>	65
2.2.1. Rationale	65
2.2.2. Criteria	66
2.2.3. Goal and necessary means	67
2.2.4. Chance of result occurring	67
2.3. <i>Dolus indirectus</i>	69
2.3.1. Criteria	69
2.3.2. Rationale	70
2.3.3. Certainty	72
2.3.4. Necessary means versus side-effects	73
2.4. A neutral concept	74

2.4.1. Moral enrichment of intent in England.	75
2.4.2. Ulterior intent	79
2.4.3. The use of ulterior intent.	80
2.4.4. Ulterior intent and motive.	81
2.4.5. Proof of ulterior intent.	82
2.4.6. No <i>dolus malus</i>	85
2.4.7. Unless <i>dolus</i> relates to wrongfulness	88
2.4.8. Unless <i>dolus</i> relates to normative elements	93
2.5. Knowledge	94
2.5.1. Tacit and latent knowledge	95
2.5.2. Knowledge and belief	96
2.5.3. Wilful blindness	97
3. <i>Dolus eventualis</i>	99
3.1. Terminology	100
3.2. Rationale	102
3.3. Criteria	103
3.4. Risk	104
3.4.1. Possibility versus considerable risk	105
3.4.2. Chance of being infected with HIV	105
3.4.3. The likelihood and its acceptance.	107
3.4.4. The assessment of risks.	108
3.4.5. Relevant factors.	110
3.5. Awareness of the risk.	112
3.6. Accepting the risk	115
3.6.1. Acceptance of the risk.	116
3.6.2. Proving the volitional element	118
3.6.3. Acceptance inferred from probability	119
3.6.4. Acceptance of lethal results	120
3.6.5. Acceptance inferred from possibility	126
3.6.6. Cognitive theories on intent	126
3.6.7. Acceptance inferred from foreseeability	128
3.6.8. Normative theories	130
3.6.9. Moderate objective approach	131
4. Recklessness	134
4.1. Rationale	134
4.2. Terminology	134
4.3. Criteria	135
4.4. Awareness	136
4.5. Unreasonable risk	136
4.5.1. Unreasonable.	137
4.5.2. Unjustified.	138
4.5.3. Valuation	138
4.6. Caldwell recklessness	139

5.	<i>Dolus eventualis</i> versus recklessness	142
5.1.	Differences	142
5.1.1.	Volitional element	142
5.1.2.	Normative risk	143
5.1.3.	<i>Tertium quid</i>	144
5.2.	Three instead of two	144
5.2.1.	Intended versus foreseen results	144
5.2.2.	<i>Dolus eventualis</i> distorts intent	145
5.3.	Awareness over volition	148
5.3.1.	<i>Dolus eventualis</i> is controversial	148
5.3.2.	Controversy due to volition	149
5.3.3.	Proving fault from awareness or objective danger	150
5.3.4.	Proof of volition by rules of general experience	151
5.3.5.	Is it warranted to distinguish by volition?	152
5.3.6.	Awareness is the better dividing line	154
5.3.7.	Easier to prove	155
5.4.	Normative aspects	158
5.5.	Fault in attempt and participation	160
5.5.1.	Attempt	161
5.5.2.	Participation	163
5.6.	Concluding remarks	164
6.	<i>Culpa</i>	166
6.1.	Terminology	167
6.2.	Rationale	168
6.2.1.	A balanced approach	168
6.2.2.	Popularity	172
6.3.	Criteria	174
6.4.	Objective part	175
6.4.1.	Violation of a duty of care	176
6.4.2.	Contra-indications	179
6.4.3.	Reasonable person	183
6.4.4.	Causation	186
6.4.5.	Gross carelessness	191
6.5.	Subjective part	193
6.5.1.	Assumed with the objective part	193
6.5.2.	Negated by an excuse	195
6.5.3.	Position in the framework of criminal liability	197
6.6.	<i>Minus</i> or <i>aliud</i>	198
6.7.	<i>Luxuria</i>	199
6.7.1.	Criteria	200
6.7.2.	Functional equivalents	201
6.7.3.	Reconsidering recklessness	203

Chapter V	
Principles of <i>mens rea</i>	205
1. Introduction	205
2. Correspondence principle	206
2.1. Fault requirement	206
2.2. Referential principle	208
2.3. Strict liability	209
2.3.1. Terminology	210
2.3.2. Rationale	211
2.3.3. Popularity	213
2.3.4. Functional equivalents	218
2.3.5. Valuation	224
2.3.6. Traffic offences	228
2.3.7. Concluding remarks	231
2.4. Mistake on the offence definition	234
2.4.1. Terminology	234
2.4.2. Overcoming the inexorable logic	236
2.5. Unintended outcomes	239
2.5.1. <i>Error in persona vel obiecto</i>	240
2.5.2. <i>Aberratio ictus</i>	242
2.5.3. Transferred fault	246
2.5.4. Multiple-actor scenarios	247
2.5.5. Conclusion	248
3. Principle of contemporaneity	250
3.1. <i>Dolus antecedens</i> and <i>subsequens</i>	251
3.2. <i>Dolus generalis</i>	252
3.3. Reversed <i>dolus generalis</i>	255
3.4. <i>Actio libera in causa</i>	256
3.5. Intoxication	258
3.5.1. English law	260
3.5.2. Dutch law	262
3.5.3. German law	264
3.5.4. Synthesis	267
4. Concluding remarks	268
Part 3	
Defences	273
Chapter VI	
What are defences?	277
1. Affirmative defences	277
2. General defences	278

3. Substantive defences	279
4. Complete defences	281
5. Conclusion	282

Chapter VII

Offences and defences	285
---------------------------------	-----

1. Legality	286
1.1. Limiting defences	287
1.2. Extending and creating defences	288
1.3. Guidelines	290
2. Burden of proof	291
3. Judgment	292
4. Defensive purpose	293
4.1. Dual requirement	294
4.2. Purpose versus mere awareness	296
4.3. Negligent offences	297
4.4. Unknowing justification	298
5. Putative defences	299
5.1. The distinction	300
5.2. Negation of fault	301
5.3. Honest or reasonable mistake	303
5.4. Justification or excuse	306
5.5. <i>Error in persona</i> and <i>aberratio ictus</i>	309
5.6. The distinction reconsidered	310
5.7. Putative excuses	310
6. The distinction under pressure	311
6.1. Non-ideal offences	312
6.2. Affirmative or failure of proof defence	314
7. Reaffirming the distinction	315
7.1. Different meanings of non-ideal elements	316
7.2. Essential element of the offence	317

Chapter VIII

Justifications and excuses	321
--------------------------------------	-----

1. Historic origins	321
2. Controversy	324
3. Differences	325
3.1. Communication	325
3.2. Rationale and conditions	326
3.3. Enabling measures	326
3.4. Complete or partial negation of the implied element	327

3.5. Personal and universal application	329
3.6. Incompatibility	330
3.7. Order of assessment	331
3.8. Conclusion	332
Chapter IX	
Justifications	333
1. Rationale	333
2. Wrongfulness	334
3. Self-defence	335
3.1. Rationale	335
3.1.1. Natural right	336
3.1.2. Legal order	337
3.1.3. Forfeiture	338
3.1.4. Weighing of interests	339
3.2. Scope	340
3.3. Criteria	342
3.4. Necessity	345
3.4.1. Wrongful attack	345
3.4.2. Legitimate interests	348
3.4.3. Imminence	351
3.4.4. Possibility to retreat	353
3.4.5. Prior fault	356
3.5. Proportionality	361
3.5.1. Least intrusive means	362
3.5.2. Proportionality <i>stricto sensu</i>	362
3.5.3. Objective standard	363
3.5.4. Developments	365
4. Necessity	369
4.1. Rationale	371
4.2. Sources	374
4.3. Criteria	377
4.4. Subsidiarity	378
4.4.1. Legitimate interests	378
4.4.2. Imminence	379
4.4.3. No other means of aversion	382
4.4.4. Prior fault	387
4.5. Proportionality	389
4.5.1. Legal interests	390
4.5.2. Concrete interference	392
4.5.3. Joint risky ventures	393
4.6. Lack of material wrongfulness	398

5. Consent	401
5.1. Rationale	402
5.2. Criteria	403
5.3. Waived interests	403
5.3.1. Individual legal interests	403
5.3.2. Public policy limitations	404
5.4. Capacity	407
5.4.1. Intellectual and moral maturity	408
5.4.2. Presumed consent	409
5.4.3. Free and informed consent	411
5.5. Affirmative or failure of proof defence	413
5.5.1. Distinguishing feature	414
5.5.2. Defensive purpose	415
5.5.3. Capacity to consent	416
5.5.4. Contextual approach	416
5.6. Conclusion	417
 Chapter X	
Excuses	419
1. Rationale	419
2. Blameworthiness	421
3. Self-defence-excess	424
3.1. Rationale	424
3.2. Criteria	425
3.3. Necessity	426
3.4. State of mind	427
3.5. Proportionality	430
3.6. Partial defences in English law	431
3.6.1. Loss of control	432
3.6.2. Diminished responsibility	436
4. Duress	438
4.1. Rationale	438
4.2. Sources	441
4.3. Criteria	442
4.4. Subsidiarity	444
4.4.1. Legitimate interests	444
4.4.2. Source of the danger	446
4.4.3. Imminent danger	450
4.4.4. No other means of aversion	450
4.4.5. Prior fault	453
4.5. Proportionality	455
4.5.1. Murder	457
4.5.2. Ticking bomb scenarios	460

5. Mistake as to the legal prohibition	464
5.1. Two categories of mistakes	465
5.2. Rationale	467
5.3. Only an unavoidable mistakes excuses	469
5.3.1. Duty to gain insight	470
5.3.2. Official advice	471
5.3.3. Unpublished legislation	473
5.3.4. Other considerations	474
5.4. Conclusion	474
6. Superior orders	476
6.1. Superior orders as a justification	476
6.2. Rationale	477
6.3. Scope	479
6.4. Criteria	480
6.5. Conclusion	483
7. Insanity	483
7.1. Rationale	483
7.2. Related issues	486
7.2.1. Two-lane approach	486
7.2.2. Punishment according to guilt	487
7.2.3. Unfit to plead	487
7.3. Criteria	489
7.4. Mental disorder	490
7.4.1. The origin of the disorder	490
7.4.2. Affect and intoxication	492
7.4.3. Other disorders	493
7.4.4. Conclusion	494
7.5. Capacities	494
7.5.1. Evaluative capacities	495
7.5.2. Cognitive capacities	496
7.5.3. Volitional capacities	497
7.5.4. Attribution	499
7.5.5. Diminished capacity	501
7.6. Exemption or excuse	502
Part 4	
Conclusion	507
Chapter XI	
Conclusion	509
1. General conclusions	509
1.1. Recklessness instead of <i>dolus eventualis</i>	510

1.2. Strict liability	511
1.3. The scope of defences	513
2. <i>Mens rea</i>	517
2.1. Rationale	517
2.2. <i>Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea</i>	519
2.3. Fault elements	521
2.4. Relevant factors	524
3. Defences	526
3.1. The distinction with the offence	528
3.2. Justifications and excuses	530
3.3. General principles governing defences	531
3.4. Justifications	532
3.4.1. Self-defence.	532
3.4.2. Necessity	533
3.4.3. Consent	535
3.5. Excuses	535
3.5.1. Self-defence-excess.	536
3.5.2. Duress	537
3.5.3. Mistake as to the legal prohibition, putative defences and superior orders	538
3.5.4. Insanity	540
4. Final words	541
<i>Summary</i>	543
<i>Samenvatting</i>	555
<i>Selected bibliography</i>	569
<i>Curriculum Vitae of Jeroen Blomsma</i>	621

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AC	Appeals Cases
AG	Advocate General
appl. no.	application number
art.	article
All ER	All England Law Reports
BayObLG	Bayerisches Oberstes Landesgericht
BeckRS	Beck-Rechtsprechung
BGB	Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch
BGH	Bundesgerichtshof
BGHSt	Bundesgerichtshof's Official Gazette, criminal cases
BGHZ	Bundesgerichtshof's Official Gazette, civil cases
BtMG	Betäubungsmittelgesetz
BVerfG(E)	(Decision of the) Bundesverfassungsgericht
BVerwG(E)	(Decision of the) Bundesverwaltungsgericht
CFR	Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU
CLR	Commonwealth Law Reports
COM	Document originating from the EU Commission
CPS	Crown Prosecution Service
Cr App R	Criminal Appeal Reports
Crim LR	Criminal Law Review
DPP	Director of Public Prosecutions
EC	European Communities
ECHR	European Convention of Human Rights
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
ECJ	European Court of Justice
ECR	European Court Reports
EP	European Parliament
EPPO	European Public Prosecutor's Office
EU	European Union
EWCA	England & Wales Court of Appeal
EWHC	England & Wales High Court
GA	Goldammer's Archiv für Strafrecht
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GG	Grundgesetz
HMG	Hoog Militair Gerechtshof
HR	Hoge Raad
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IRG	Gesetz über die internationale Rechtshilfe in Strafsachen

List of abbreviations

jo.	<i>juncto</i>
JR	Juristische Rundschau
JZ	Juristenzeitung
KB	King's Bench
LJ(J)	Lord Justice(s) of Appeal
MDR	Monatsschrift für Deutsches Recht
MPC	Metropolitan Police Commissioner
NbSr	Nieuwsbrief Strafrecht
NJ	Nederlandse Jurisprudentie
NJB	Nederlands Juristenblad
(N)JW	(Neue) Juristische Wochenschrift
NStZ(-RR)	Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (-Rechtsprechungsreport)
NVwZ	Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht
OJ L	Official Journal of the EU – Legislation
OJ C	Official Journal of the EU – Information and notices
OLAF	European Anti-Fraud Office
OLG	Oberlandesgericht
OWiG	Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz
QB(D)	Queen's Bench (Division)
R.	Regina
Rb.	Rechtbank
Re	Regarding (ablative of <i>res</i>)
REV	Revised version of a EU document
RG	Reichsgericht
RGSt	Reichsgericht, criminal cases
RvdW	Rechtspraak van de week
s.	Section
SIEC	Significantly impede effective competition
StV	Strafverteidiger
StVG	Straßenverkehrsgezet
StVO	Straßenverkehrs-Ordnung
Stb.	Staatsblad
StGB	Strafgesetzbuch
StPO	Strafprozessordnung
TEU	Treaty on the European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the functioning of the European Union
UK	United Kingdom
UKHL	United Kingdom House of Lords
UKPC	United Kingdom Privy Council
US	United States (of America)
v.	versus
VRS	Verkehrsrechts-Sammlung
WLR	Weekly Law Reports